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ADAPTATION AND THE SCHOOL OF WAR

John T. Kuehn

Mars Adapting: Military Change during War, by Frank G.
Hoffman. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2021. 368
pages. $39.95.

Retired Marine officer and National Defense University research fellow Frank
Hoffman’s Mars Adapting is, first and foremost, a work of military theory. Hoffman initially achieved notoriety for his work and briefs about something he characterized as hybrid or compound warfare, since popularized alongside the rise in
interest in gray-zone conflict.1 This book’s major contribution is similarly theoretical, but in the area of institutional learning, not modalities of war. Hoffman argues
“for greater consideration of Organizational Learning Theory [OLT] to establish
an analytical framework.” That framework leads to a model presented in chapter
2 (where most of his theoretical discussion resides) that Hoffman devised to understand the processes by which military institutions adapt in war (pp. 40–42).
The book can be broken into three sections. First, Hoffman explains his approach, then presents his framework and model in the introduction and chapter 2. Hoffman’s use of OLT results in a model that explains adaptation by organizations engaged in combat as a learning process. This model, derived from a
number of social science disciplines, has four steps, with feedback mechanisms,
that Hoffman labels “inquire,” “interpret,” “investigate,” and “integrate & institutionalize” (p. 40, table 2.2). He calls this the Organizational Learning Cycle
(OLC). He also identifies four attributes that contribute to something known as
“Organizational Learning Capacity,” which essentially is the ability of an organization to learn (or not learn). The factors are leadership, organizational culture,
learning mechanisms, and dissemination mechanisms (pp. 44–54).
The second section of the book consists of four chapters, each of which focuses
on adaptation in war by organizations and instituJohn T. Kuehn is a professor of military history at
tions as a means by which to test his model. He
the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
and a former Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime focuses primarily on armed-service institutions
History with the Hattendorf Historical Center at the
as the entities to which he applies his adaptation–
Naval War College. He retired from the U.S. Navy in
organizational learning model. The cases proceed
2004 at the rank of commander after twenty-three
years of service as a naval flight officer. His latest chronologically and cover the following: the U.S.
book, with David Holden, is The 100 Worst Military Navy and its submarine campaign in the Pacific
Disasters in History (ABC-CLIO, 2020).
during World War II (chapter 3), the U.S. Air Force
in the Korean War (chapter 4), Vietnam and the
Naval War College Review, Autumn 2021, Vol. 74, No. 4
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021

1

146

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 74 [2021], No. 4, Art. 12

U.S. Army (chapter 5), and finally the Marines in Iraq at the various battles of
Fallujah (chapter 6). The final chapter, comprising the third section, presents his
conclusions, derived from how his model fared in each of these cases and the
implications raised in the process.
The first case study shows how messy adaptation was for the U.S. Navy and
its submarine force in the Pacific against Japan. While this campaign often is
presented as an outstanding success, it got off to a rocky start. As Hoffman notes,
problems of one kind often masked deeper problems that delayed the campaign
achieving efficacy, and despite having very good submarines as the basic tool of
war. This study, especially, supports Hoffman’s contention about bottom-up innovation, in this case at the individual submarine crew and leader levels, as being
critical to successful adaptation in war (pp. 102–103). The chapter supports as
well his ideas about Organizational Learning Capacity, at least at the level of the
submarine community, if not the larger Navy. This first case study also lets the
reader know that Hoffman’s approach includes a “warts and all” objectivity and
emphasizes how contingent the adaptation process can be. Another conclusion
that emerges is that adaptation in war can be not only a messy but a lethal business, and one that not always is rewarded.
The second study, on airpower in Korea and the Air Force, brings to the fore
the problems of culture. At the time of the war’s outbreak, that service’s mind-set
could be characterized as “bomber culture.” Because this culture left the larger
Air Force leadership in some sense myopic, Hoffman again finds that adaptation
tended to bubble up from the bottom, from the fighter and attack pilots in the
theater. One problem with this chapter is its conflation of airpower with the Air
Force. This is unfortunate, since both the Marines and the Navy participated
also, and the chapter might have provided even more grist for Hoffman’s mill if
it had included a more detailed look at these airpower organizations. Either that,
or Hoffman might have made clear what was “just Air Force” versus the larger
joint, and even coalition, air effort. It was not a homogeneous air campaign with
absolute unity of command, which was indeed what the Air Force had wanted
ever since 1947. In the end, though, Hoffman—on the basis of very thin evidence—gives the Air Force credit for being more adaptive than the other services
(p. 152). This seems odd, given that the air components of the Marines and Navy
presumably were a part of the success under discussion.
The third case study, on Vietnam, is the most critical, as one would expect.
Here Hoffman does find the U.S. Army adapting, but to little effect beyond the
tactical level and far too slowly in relation to the enemy. This case study emphasizes the relational dynamic of his model. Military adaptation does not occur in a
vacuum; as it is often put in U.S. professional military education institutions, “the
enemy gets a vote.” Thus, this might be characterized as the book’s “failure” case
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss4/12
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study, illustrating why adaptation can occur but still be insufficient to achieve an
organization’s objectives. Hoffman finds that the result of the Army’s adaptation
“went no further than to reinforce the firepower-centric approach favored by the
operational commander” (p. 196). Unlike the U.S. Navy’s submarine experience
in World War II, adaptation did not produce strategic results or lead to success
in Vietnam for the U.S. Army.
In the final case study Hoffman addresses the Marines in central Iraq around
Fallujah. Here again he is on solid ground, with his model holding up well in
its explanatory power and its contention that organizational learning from the
bottom up can lead to successful systemic adaptation and thereby have an outsize effect beyond the tactical-level battlefield. Of the four case studies, this one
comes the closest to supplying what “right” looks like, especially with respect to
OLC and the Marines’ ability to learn quickly from their mistakes and then diffuse new ways of doing business. However, one would expect the U.S. military
to have made some progress since the Vietnam War in improving its systems for
organizational learning and dissemination. That did seem to be the case for the
Marines in Iraq, despite the Corps suffering from considerable “forgetting” after
Vietnam and leading up to the events in Iraq after 2003.
Unsurprisingly, Hoffman concludes by offering up the OLC “postulated in
this book . . . as a useful framework of a complicated heuristic process” (p. 248).
The case studies provide considerable support as well for his thesis that OLT is a
useful approach for studying adaptation in war. Readers of this journal will find
his implications (pp. 269–270) valuable when they become decision makers and
leaders of organizations themselves. At that point they will be responsible, for
example, for creating mechanisms to discover and disseminate new ways of doing
business that lead to mission success.
The book does have some weaknesses, albeit minor. First, it is a ponderous
read, especially chapter 2; at times it reads like a social science dissertation. There
is an odd inconsistency in personal pronoun usage, with Hoffman switching
from “I” to “we” and “us” for no discernible reason, especially since he is the only
author. Despite these quibbles, students of military innovation and adaptation
will find much in the book to appreciate and ponder. Military historians will find
value in Hoffman’s application of his model to the case studies about adaptation
in war. Strategists and professional military educators alike will find the conclusions in the final chapter worth—in Hoffman’s phrasing—investigating.

NOTE

1. See, for example, Frank G. Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars (Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007).
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